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Abstract 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, taxation of the financial sector has forcefully re-emerged on 
the European Union political agenda. One proposal – rightly or wrongly – received much political 
attention: a broad-based tax on financial transactions. What had for years existed as a utopia in the 
minds of grass roots movements, reached a legal and political milestone during Commission President 
Barosso’s State of the Union speech on 28 September 2011. There he presented a proposal for an EU 
Directive on a financial transaction tax installed across the 27 EU Member States. It was then an 
explicit objective of the Union that it would lead by example, and that its pan-European 
implementation would prove the global feasibility of a financial transaction tax (FTT). The Cannes G-
20 Meeting early November 2011 under French chairmanship was expected to launch the global 
dimension of the FTT, using the momentum created by the proposed EU FTT Directive two months 
earlier. However, the European sovereign debt crisis caused the EU to teeter on the brink of political, 
financial and economic collapse, and momentum for a global FTT seemed utterly lost. Nonetheless, 
political discussions within the Union continued, and at the time of writing – Spring 2012 – 
discussions in the Council were on-going for some form of pan-EU.  
The global implementation of the EU FTT Directive is a tale of divided political views between 
Member States of the Union, the pursuit of an elusive single voice in the G-20, and the use of legal 
instruments for political reasons. In this paper, it will serve as a case-study for the EU seeking to shape 
global financial governance in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, in line with its binding, law-
oriented mission statement of Article 21 TEU. In light of this, this contribution investigates EU 
(im)potence to affect legal and institutional processes in global (financial) governance. 
Keywords 
Financial Taxation – European Union – Global Financial Governance – G20 
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1. Introduction 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, taxation of the financial sector has forcefully re-emerged on 
the European Union political agenda.1 Since then, several EU Member States and the European 
Parliament have sought to stimulate this idea in the form of a financial transaction tax (FTT). What 
had for years existed as a political utopia in the minds of grass roots movements, reached a legal and 
political milestone during Commission President Barosso’s State of the Union speech on 28 
September 2011. There he presented a proposal for an EU Directive on a financial transaction tax 
installed across the 27 EU Member States, to serve as an example for the world. In a previous paper I 
have outlined key features of such a global implementation.2 I argued that the Union would have to 
propose a binding multilateral treaty, with as broad as possible a global membership. This multilateral 
Convention would establish the legal framework within which to levy, manage and disperse the 
proceeds of an international FTT – and in short, would imply thorough reform of the global financial 
governance system as it exists at present. The Cannes G-20 Meeting early November 2011 under 
French chairmanship was expected to launch the global dimension of the FTT, using the momentum 
created by the proposed EU FTT Directive two months earlier. However, the European sovereign debt 
crisis and Greek Drama yet again reached new heights, and with the EU teetering on the brink, 
momentum for a global FTT seemed utterly lost. Nonetheless, political discussions within the Union 
continued, and at the time of writing – Spring 2012 – discussions in the Council were on-going. Thus, 
the EU proposal may yet become law, if not at global, then at regional level. 
The global implementation of the EU FTT Directive is a tale of divided political views between 
Member States of the Union, the pursuit of an elusive single voice in the G-20, and the use of legal 
instruments for political reasons, with an as of yet unwritten conclusion. In this paper, it will serve as a 
case-study for the EU seeking to shape global financial governance in the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis, in line with its binding, law-oriented mission statement of Article 21 TEU. In light of this, this 
contribution investigates EU (im)potence to affect legal and institutional processes in global 
governance required for implementation of the FTT.  
2. The Union’s Mission in Global Financial Governance 
The 2001 Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union strongly asserted a global role for 
the EU in its characteristically grand language:3 ‘Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a 
leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role 
worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples?’ The European Convention 
started work soon after that declaration was made, in order to draw up a Constitutional Treaty for the 
European Union. In an early draft produced by the Commission (called the Penelope project), that 
institution’s proposal of December 2002 contained the following provision under the heading ‘external 
economic relations policy’:4“Article III – 97 External economic action by the Union shall contribute 
to the harmonious development of the world economy. To that end the Union shall adopt a single 
                                                     
1 This contribution was closed on 21 March 2012. 
2 Bart Van Vooren, The EU as a global Robin Hood: Proposal for a Multilateral Convention on a Global Financial 
Transaction Tax, CLEER Working Papers 2011/4 (2011). [Hereafter: Van Vooren, EU as Robin Hood] 
3 European Council, Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, 14-15 December, 2001, subheading 
‘Expectations of Europe’s citizens’. 
4 European Commission, Feasibility Study, Contribution to a Preliminary Draft, Constitution of the European Union, 4 
December 2002, Available from: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/Penelope%20pdf_en.pdf [Last Accessed 19 March 
2002] I am grateful to Joris Larik for pointing me to this provision. 
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position in relations with non-member countries and in international organisations with 
responsibilities for economic and financial matters. It shall support the effectiveness and 
transparency of the financial markets in order to reduce financial volatility and speculation at 
global level.” This Commission proposal took the EU single voice far beyond the comparatively 
narrow scope of the Common Commercial Policy. However, the call for unified EU representation in 
global economic governance writ large was not picked up by the Convention, and it did not find its 
way into the draft Constitution or the Lisbon Treaty. Should this have happened, a strong case could 
have been made that the Union would have a legally binding obligation to implement a financial 
transaction tax, or a global measure with equivalent effect of reducing financial volatility and 
speculation.5 Even so, the Union could still reap great benefits from the successful global 
implementation of the FTT:6 First, success in this regard would be supportive of the Union’s self-
imposed image of the value-based international actor;7 and second, it would do much to provide post-
Lisbon legitimacy towards its own citizens through effectiveness as an international actor. An FTT 
would have as its purpose the financing of global public goods such as the Millennium Development 
Goals and additional funding to climate change; and therefore respond to calls for a fairer contribution 
of the financial sector to society writ large. Additionally, such a tax would have a significant 
regulatory impact towards a more stable financial system which is currently dominated by non-binding 
soft law.8 In sum, the FTT would lead to - and require a sea-change to international financial law and 
governance with the European Union guiding the way in line with its constitutional objectives.9 
Even though no mission statement for the EU in global financial governance has been included in 
EU primary law, the more general legal obligations to that end are nevertheless pertinent. A role for 
the Union whereby it ‘stabilizes’ the world, and ‘points the way ahead’ is not merely a moral 
imperative, but a legally binding obligation embedded in primary law. Article 3(5) TEU states that in 
its relations with the wider world, ‘the Union shall(...) contribute to peace, (...) the sustainable 
development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, 
eradication of poverty (...) as well as to the strict observance and the development of international 
law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’ (Emphasis added) The 
language “shall” indicates the binding nature of this mission statement, which has been confirmed by 
the Court of Justice in a recent judgment of 22 December 2011 concerning the global reach of the 
Emissions Trading Scheme. Here the Court affirmed that this article imposes a substantive, legal 
obligation on the Union “to contribute to the strict observance and the development of international 
law.”10 Thus, the Union is not just morally, but in fact legally obliged to pursue equality amongst 
wealthy and poorer nations, to support their development and ensure ‘fairness’ between them. In doing 
so, the TEU not only imposes substantive requirements on EU international relations, but also a strong 
methodological imperative: according to Article 3 TEU and confirmed in Article 21(1) TEU, the EU 
‘shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation and which it seeks to advance 
in the wider world: (...) respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law.’ In other words, the Union must pursue a just and fair global order, entrenched in multilateral 
                                                     
5 On such effects see Van Vooren, EU as Robin Hood, 10-14. 
6 Though certainly, the hazards and pitfalls are equally great. See Van Vooren, o.c., EU as Robin Hood. 
7 U. Khaliq, Ethical Dimensions of the Foreign Policy of the European Union - A Legal Appraisal (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); R.Petrov and P. Leino,‘Between 'Common Values' and Competing Universals - The Promotion 
of the EU's Common Values through the European Neighbourhood Policy’, 15 European Law Journal (2009). 
8 Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance - and Not Trade, 13 Journal of International Economic 
Law 623-643(2010), 627.; Ernst Baltensperger and Thomas Cottier, The Role of International Law in Monetary Affairs, 
13 Journal of International Economic Law 911-937(2010), 935. 
9 See Joris Larik, “Entrenching Global Governance: The EU’s Constitutional Objectives caught between a sanguine world 
view and a daunting reality”, in Bart Van Vooren, Steven Blockmans & Jan Wouters (eds), ‘The EU’s role in global 
governance: the legal dimension’, Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2012. 
10 Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America (ATAA), of 21 December 2011, nyr, para 101.  
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solutions based on the rule of law. The global implementation of a financial transaction tax through a 
multilateral, binding international convention requiring unprecedented positive change to international 
financial governance does exactly that.  
If the argument stemming from EU primary law is perhaps slightly abstract and legalistic, the 
connection to expectations of European citizens should be less so. Indeed, the financial transaction tax 
is a concrete iteration of where the Laeken Declaration in the abstract invoked of EU citizens’ wishes. 
This is underlined by the Commission’s public consultation on the FTT which ended in April 2011. 
That consultation clearly showed that civil society across the European Union broadly supports the 
financial transaction tax.11 From the Commission’s summary report,12 it is clear that NGOs and trade 
unions are strongly in favour of a broad-based financial transactions tax and that individual citizens 
also ‘generally favour’ such a broad-based levy. Conversely, and unsurprisingly, financial 
organisations and businesses, consultancies and their relevant representative organisations generally 
oppose any and all types of additional tax burden on the financial sector or financial markets in 
general.13Thus, given the broad popular support amongst European citizens it is submitted that 
successfully working towards the FTT at global level would bring the Union legitimacy through 
effectiveness. Individual Member States will be unable to exert sufficient influence in the G-20 to 
realize a global financial transaction tax, but should the Union manage to speak with its proverbial 
single voice in a sustained lobbying effort at the highest echelons, success may be within reach with 
commensurate effects on the EU’s standing in the hearts and minds of European citizens. 
In the remainder of this contribution I shall trace the EU’s efforts in placing the FTT on the global 
political agenda, so as to draw conclusions on the EU’s ability to deliver on its mission statement of 
pursuing a multilateral law-based governance agenda, and to deliver upon its citizens’ wish have the 
financial sector contribute more fairly to society writ large. 
3. A Global FTT: Political Context at EU and International Level 
At their September 2009 meeting in Pittsburgh, political momentum post-financial crisis was such that 
G-20 leaders agreed to pursue a number of deep changes to global economic governance. They agreed 
to set up ‘a framework for strong, sustainable and balanced growth’, ‘an international regulatory 
system for banks and other financial firms that would reign in the excesses that led to the crisis’, and 
‘to reform the global economic governance architecture to meet the needs of the 
21stcentury’.14Through these transformations, they wished to curb excessive risk-taking and 
recklessness in the global financial system, which was perceived as the root cause for the financial 
crisis of 2008. However, the Pittsburgh communiqué did not refer to international financial taxation in 
any form, and focused on reforming capital requirements,15 compensation in the financial sector, 
improved over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets,16 and moral hazard problems related to 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). It did however request that the IMF prepare a 
report ‘on the range of options (...) as to how the financial sector could make a fair and substantial 
                                                     
11 All responses to the consultation as well as a summary by the Commission are available 
at:<http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/common/consultations/tax/2011_02_financial_sector_taxation_en.htm> (Last 
accessed 16 August 2011) 
12 Commission summary report, May 2011, available at: 
 <http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/consultations/tax/financial_sector/summary_results
_en.pdf>. 
13 ‘Banks and markets oppose financial transaction tax, EurActiv,18 August 2011 <http://www.euractiv.com/en/euro-
finance/banks-markets-oppose-financial-transaction-tax-news-507022>. 
14 G-20 Leaders’ Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit, 24-25 September 2009, 2. 
15 Ibid, 8. 
16 Ibid, 9. 
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contribution toward paying for any burdens associated with government interventions to repair the 
banking system.’17 The IMF delivered that report by the June 2010 G-20 summit in Toronto.18 In the 
lead-up to that event, the European Council strongly voiced its support for the FTT: 
‘The EU should lead efforts to set a global approach for introducing systems for levies and taxes on 
financial institutions with a view to maintaining a world-wide level playing field and will strongly 
defend this position with its G-20 partners. The introduction of a global financial transaction tax 
should be explored and developed further in that context.’19 
Upon delivery of the report the Toronto Summit merely ‘thanked’ the IMF, and beyond the 
mentioning of a few generic principles in the final summit communiqué, the EU did not succeed at 
having the idea discussed more substantively at that meeting.20 What seemed a tempest in a teapot was 
no longer even mentioned in the Declaration of the Seoul Summit in November 2010. The 
communiqué from the February 2011 G-20 meeting of Finance ministers and Central Bank governors 
only cursorily referred to the financial transaction tax, in preparation of the G-20 meeting in Cannes 
on 4 November 2011. The intensions of the French Presidency were quite clear in this regard. On 20 
September 2010, Nicolas Sarkozy addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations, where he 
stated that:  
‘(...)as the future president of the G-20 and the G8 (...) I will strive to promote the idea of 
innovative financing (...)[W]e must find new sources of financing to fight against poverty (...)We 
can decide here to implement innovative financing, the taxation of financial transactions. Why 
wait? Finance has been globalized. Why shouldn’t we demand that finance contribute to 
stabilizing the world through a minuscule tax on each financial transaction?’ (emphasis added) 
Whether President Sarkozy was truly committed to the fight against poverty, or saw this as a pet 
project to woo voters in preparation for the French presidential elections in April 2012, is a political 
question beyond the purview of this contribution. Undoubtedly both factors played an important role, 
with the end result being that France was the most vocal EU Member State favouring the global, and if 
not possible, EU-level implementation of the financial transaction tax. However, this points to the first 
central obstacle to the EU pursuing the global implementation of the financial transaction tax. Indeed, 
in the highlighted portion of the quoted speech by Mr. Sarkozy, it said that he himself, as president of 
the G-20 and G-8 would be promoting the idea of a financial transaction tax. This in opposition to the 
27 Member States qua European Union, using its political capital and diplomatic resources to 
convince the global community of the merits of this idea. The European Council of June 2010 may 
have adopted conclusions that it support the exploration of a global financial transaction tax, but the 
Member States themselves are entirely divided as to whether this is truly a key issue on its 
international relations to-do list. 
The United Kingdom and Sweden have been the most vocal, sceptical Member States on the merits 
of this idea. For example, speaking in September 2010 the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that he 
could not see in practice how the FTT would work, and that ‘while it has been discussed for many 
decades, it would be discussed for many more decades to come.’21 Germany had been more receptive 
to the idea. This EU Member State indeed defends the FTT in principle – with its Finance Minister 
stating that the technical problems are not insurmountable, and that the tax provides an answer to the 
financial sector contributing its fair share to financing public coffers, but he stated explicitly that his 
                                                     
17 Ibid, 10. 
18 International Monetary Fund, A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector, Final Report for the G-20 
(June 2010). 
19 European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 17 June 2010, 6-7. 
20 K. Lannoo, ‘The EU's Response to the Financial Crisis: A mid-term review’, CEPS Policy Brief No. 241 (April 2011), 6. 
21 ‘Finance Ministers Fail to Agree on EU Financial Transaction Tax’, Taxation International 7 September 2010. 
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country would not introduce such a tax unilaterally.22 The first crucial obstacle to Union success on 
the international scene as regards the financial transaction tax therefore lies within itself: On the one 
hand we have France, supported by other Member States such as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Italy, and Spain, in favour of the global or EU financial transaction tax. On the other hand we have the 
UK joined by Malta, the Czech Republic and Sweden who are far more sceptical of the idea. These 
countries offer legal, political and economic resistance to the notion that the FTT would provide for a 
fairer contribution of the financial sector; that it would stabilize financial markets, and that it would 
remove much of the ‘useless’ gambling-like financial transactions. One oft-quoted example is Sweden, 
having unsuccessfully adopted such a tax similar to the FTT from the mid-1980s. The tax was 
progressively widened in scope and heightened in rate, and by 1990 more than 50% of its securities 
trading activity moved to London and other financial centres.23 Because of this real risk of 
geographical relocation, Sweden is urging other G-20 countries not to adopt the FTT, but rather to opt 
alternatives to the taxation of financial transactions.24 Whether or not the Swedish example is due to 
design flaws in the tax, in political minds there is an undeniable apprehension towards any risk of 
geographical relocation with commensurate effects on financial centres and national economies. Given 
the crucial role of London in global finance, and commensurate revenues for UK public coffers, the 
United Kingdom is the most vocal intra-EU opponent to the EU-wide or global implementation of the 
financial transaction tax. The reasons for this are not merely related to the risk of relocation of ‘the 
City’ to third countries, but rather of a public financial nature. Indeed, the United Kingdom actually 
has a form of financial transaction taxation, from which it receives up to six billion pounds annually.25 
A global or EU FTT with funds earmarked for funding climate change or the fight against global 
poverty is therefore not beneficial for UK public budgets. 
As regards support from the EU institutions, the European Parliament is most supportive of the 
FTT. In a Resolution of 8 March 2011,26 the EP stated that, in its opinion, the EU should promote the 
introduction of an FTT at global level, failing which the EU should implement an FTT at European 
level as a first step.27 In spite of the cold reception at G-20 level in June 2010, during 2011 the idea of 
an EU-level financial transaction tax has slowly begun to gain traction: in June 2011 Commission 
President Barroso spoke favourably of that option, and he indicated that during the autumn of 2011 the 
Commission would publish a proposal to that effect.28 Similarly, at the joint Sarkozy-Merkel meeting 
of 16 August 2011,29 both leaders stated that they would push towards taxing ‘corporate’ 
transactions.30 The idea(l) underlying the European implementation of the financial transaction tax is 
that the Union would ‘lead by example’, and that other nations would follow suit once the EU has 
proven that the FTT does not have the feared relocation effects on financial markets. However, at the 
technocratic level that enthusiasm has so far not been uniformly shared with political leadership. 
                                                     
22 ‘Finance Ministers Fail to Agree on EU Financial Transaction Tax’, Taxation International 7 September 2010. 
23 European Parliament, Special Committee on the Financial, Economic and Social Crisis, ‘Crisis Management, Burden 
Sharing and Solidarity Mechanisms in the EU: A Follow-up Study to Financial Supervision and Crisis Management in 
the EU’, (June 2010), 42. 
24 However, the Leading Group report argues that this is a poor example due to design problems in the Swedish tax. See 
note 58, 17. 
25 European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of 
financial transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC, Vol 9, Brussels 28 September 2011 SEC(2011) 1102 final 
26 European Parliament, Resolution on innovative financing at global and European Level, (8 March 2011). 
27 Ibid., para 16 
28 ‘Barroso to push for financial transaction tax’, European Voice, 21 June 2011. 
29 A transcript of the press conference is available at: <http://www.businessinsider.com/live-coverage-the-big-merkel-
sarkozy-meeting-youve-been-waiting-for-2011-8>. 
30 ‘Merkel and Sarkozy plan ’true economic government’,EU Observer, 18 August 2011. 
Bart Van Vooren 
14 
Politically the tax Commissioner may support the FTT,31 but in reality the Commission services 
clearly take a more sceptical stance. During the second half of 2010, the Commission published two 
thoroughly researched Communications which clearly disfavour the FTT idea (both at EU or global 
level) on the basis of technical, legal and institutional hurdles.32 We can thus already observe that a 
second obstacle to the EU acting as an effective global actor is institutional: a disjunction between the 
technocrats’ – not wholly unjustifiable – belief that the EU better spend resources on less utopian 
pursuits than the global FTT, and the top-down political pressure to work out a credible proposal and 
give it their full backing. This tension was replicated in conversations by the author with an official of 
DG ECFIN,33 and was also put as a question of the House of Lords EU select committee to 
Commissioner Semeta: “My understanding was that your own directorate and that of ECFIN were 
sceptical in giving that advice to the Commission President but that Mr Barroso wanted to bring about 
and propose the financial transaction tax as a kind of counterweight at the time of the financial crisis. 
Were those the origins? Did you give advice that FTT was a difficult thing to introduce? ”34 When the 
Commissioner avoided the question, the Chairman of the Committee continued: “I understand that, but 
did you have reservations when you discussed it in the Commission about whether this was a viable 
tax and should be brought forward? Did you and DG ECFIN have those reservations?”35 Mr. Semeta 
replied that his services had initially concluded that a financial activities tax36 was equally viable to the 
financial transaction tax, but that they decided to present the latter for the FTT provided greater 
potential revenues. However, the scenario that it was President Barrosso who pushed the Commission 
services to draw up an FTT proposal is evidenced by the fact that Commissioner Semeta in a speech of 
October 2010 has gone on recored against the transaction tax. 37 Thus it happened that on 28 
September 2011 in his ”State of the Union” speech, Commission President Barroso presented a 
proposal for an EU Directive on the FTT, to be implemented by 1 January 2014 across all 27 Member 
States.38 Speaking to the House of Lords EU Select Committee on 16 February 2012, Commissioner 
Šemeta, strongly defended the EU-line, and confirmed that this EU-level proposal must be seen as a 
stepping stone to the eventual global implementation of the FTT. He also made explicit reference to 
the need to have the UK on board if this is to be successful:39 
“An EU financial transaction tax can help to address many of the major challenges that we are 
confronted with as a Union today. It will deliver significant revenues, complement our regulatory 
framework for a more stable and responsible financial sector and contribute to a stronger single 
market. Moreover, by implementing a well-designed and well-functioning FTT across Europe, we 
can pave the way for a global approach, an objective which, like us, the UK Government have also 
committed to within the G20. An EU FTT can achieve this without compromising our 
competitiveness, without increasing unemployment or driving business from Europe. An EU FTT 
can achieve this without undermining the strength of the financial services industry in the EU. It is 
                                                     
31 Algirdas Šemeta EU Commissioner for Taxation and Customs Union, Audit and Anti-Fraud, ‘Taxing the Financial 
Sector’ Press Conference Brussels, 7 October 2010, SPEECH/10/530, 07/10/2010. 
32 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Taxation of the Financial Sector, Brussels COM(2010) 549/5; European 
Commission Staff Working Document, Taxation of the Financial Sector, Brussels COM(2010) 549. 
33 Conversation with official of DG Tax, October 2011. 
34 House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, Unrevised transcript of evidence taken on the Financial 
Transaction Tax, 16 February 2012, 4. 
35 Ibid. 
36 A tax on the balance sheet of a financial institution rather than the transaction itself. 
37 Algirdas Šemeta EU Commissioner for Taxation and Customs Union, Audit and Anti-Fraud "Taxing the Financial 
Sector", Press Conference Brussels, 7 October 2010, SPEECH/10/530, 07/10/2010 
38 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax and amending 
Directive 2008/7/EC, Brussels COM(2011) 594 final (Brussels, 28 September 2011). 
39 House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, Unrevised transcript of evidence taken on the Financial 
Transaction Tax, 16 February 2012. 
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in the overall European interest to have strong financial centres in London as well as in Paris and 
Frankfurt. In this context, we need the UK on board, actively engaged in the discussions on the 
design, fine-tuning and implementation of the financial transaction tax.”40 
In Cannes, on 3-4 November 2011, the EU proposal for a global financial transaction tax fell – if not 
on stony ground – far short of the result the French Presidency had hoped for. The meeting in Cannes 
was entirely dominated by the European sovereign debt crisis, notably in light of the Greek Prime 
Minister’s surprise announcement that a bail-out to his country would have to be approved by popular 
referendum. However, at his evening press conference on 4 November 2011, President Sarkozy stated 
that after Cannes “the financial transaction tax is still on the table, and that is an amazing 
achievement!”.41 However, the language of the G-20 Summit is as usual rather less enthusiastic:  
“We agree that, over time, new sources of funding need to be found to address development needs. 
We discussed a set of options for innovative financing highlighted by Mr Bill Gates, such as Advance 
Market Commitments, Diaspora Bonds, taxation regime for bunker fuels, tobacco taxes, and a range of 
different financial taxes. Some of us have implemented or are prepared to explore some of these 
options. We acknowledge the initiatives in some of our countries to tax the financial sector for various 
purposes, including a financial transaction tax, inter alia to support development.”42  
Thus, little has changed since the Toronto summit of June 2010, and it is uncertain what the G-20 
in Mexico will bring. In the following subsection I examine the EU proposal for a Directive 
implementing the FTT at regional EU level, and assess its potential as a stepping stone for global 
implementation. At this juncture, we may conclude that as regards the EU position on a global FTT, 
both horizontal (intra-institutional) and vertical (EU – Member State) dividing lines exist. Whereas the 
Tax Commissioner now defends the EU line, yet agreement by all 27 Member States is still lacking, it 
is clear that the latter schism is the most damaging to the single EU message in pursuit of the global 
financial transaction tax. 
4. Essential Features of the EU Proposal for an FTT Directive 
4.1 Objectives of the EU Proposal 
When James Tobin proposed to levy a small percentage on all spot conversions of one currency into 
another, the objective was to ‘throw sand in the wheels of the excessively efficient international 
money markets’,43 i.e. to deter short-term speculative currency transactions. The idea of deterring what 
are perceived as excessively risky activities by financial institutions is integral to the idea of the EU-
wide financial transaction tax, and additionally the Union wishes “to complement regulatory measures 
aimed at avoiding future crises”.44 However, there is deep disagreement on the economic merits of the 
FTT, essentially reflecting different economic schools’ ideologies on the desirability of regulatory 
intervention in markets. As a consequence, reaching consensus on the FTT proposal has been a vast 
hurdle towards implementing the tax at European - let alone global - level. In the previous subsection I 
have already indicated that this is but one of the many obstacles to global implementation of the FTT. 
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The Commission proposal makes clear proposals in this respect, and indicates the following chief 
objectives for implementing an EU wide FTT:45  
i. The first objective is to ensure that financial institutions make a fair contribution to covering the 
costs of the recent crisis, and to ensure that financial services which are exempted from VAT are 
treated equally to other sectors. Related to this argument, though not mentioned as an objective for 
the EU-FTT per se, is that the EU foresees that the projected revenue of an EU-wide FTT (57 
billion Euros) would gradually displace national contributions to the EU budget, thereby helping 
to relieve national budget deficits.  
ii. Second, market correction, namely to correct behaviour such as trend-chasing and short-termism 
out of step with the real economy, and complement on-going regulatory initiatives to ensure 
systemic, macro-economic stability. The FTT does this by limiting perceived excesses across the 
EU-27 Member States, and create appropriate disincentives for transactions that endanger the 
stability and efficiency of financial markets. 
If the EU would manage to transform these objectives into a coherent message to the world, the 
proposed EU Directive on an FTT is an important stepping stone for global implementation in that it 
provides crucial regulatory inspiration for its global implementation. From the perspective of market 
correction notably, the EU directive makes important regulatory choices, underlining the maturity of 
the proposal and its complementarity to the G-20 Pittsburg Statement to reform global financial 
governance for the 21st century. In essence, the EU Directive sets up a harmonized system in order to 
limit financial transactions which are not desired for their rationale (speculative), large volume 
(compared to real economy) or high speed (high-speed algorithmic trading). What is rather unfortunate 
however, is that the Commission proposal does not make an explicit connection to innovative 
financing for development or climate change. Elsewhere I have argued that this is a political mistake 
on the part of the Union.46 This because if it had done so, it could create political momentum through 
projecting itself as a “Global Robin Hood”, taxing the rich and giving back to the poor. By short-
sightedly connecting potential revenue of the FTT Directive to the negotiations on the next multi-
annual budget cycle, the Union has lost an important source of political legitimacy to its citizens, and 
grass roots movements across the world. Thus, it would be important to rectify that error in translating 
the EU proposal to a global message, and it would be crucial for the Union to emphasize the FTT as 
integral to global redistributive justice. In any case, in setting up a system of taxing financial 
transactions, there are three distinct concerns which need to be addressed at EU and at global level. 
First, a targeted FTT would have to be meticulously designed to reduce the risk of geographic 
relocation to non-tax jurisdictions. Second, it is necessary to ensure that the FTT does not hamper the 
real economy by limited access to capital. Third it is necessary to ensure that tax incidence does not 
befall individual citizens. 
4.2 Core Legislative Choices in the EU Proposal 
A commonly quoted statistic is that in 2007, the volume of financial transactions stood at a level 73,5 
times higher than nominal world GDP, owing largely to the growth in derivatives trading.47In 
particular, trading on derivatives markets expanded significantly stronger than trading on spot 
markets: in 2008, the volume of derivatives trading was 66 times higher than world GDP, whereas 
spot trading amounted to only 8 times world GDP. The argument goes that this indicates the skewed 
relationship between needs of the real economy and the international financial markets. Intervention is 
then necessary because only a small share of transactions stem from ‘useful’ hedging activities and the 
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greatest part of transactions is purely speculative.48 Of speculative trading, high speed algorithmic 
trading is considered particularly harmful since it is based on the trades of others thereby amplifying 
fluctuations away from equilibrium based on real economic indicators.49 The nature of the EU’s FTT 
is such that it would correct market behaviour through rendering speculative trades more costly, in 
particular high frequency technical trading which is automatized to chase trends in the short term. 
Through rendering such trades more expensive, the FTT would curb speculation and improve market 
efficiency, increase transparency, reduce excessive price volatility, and create incentives for longer-
term investments with added-value for the real economy by freeing up resources for more productive 
uses.50 Counterarguments to the FTT consider that it would limit parties’ ability to hedge risk,51 
thereby reducing liquidity and increasing short-term volatility of asset prices. The EU Directive clearly 
chooses to follow the Keynesian line of reasoning in this debate. This is distinctly illustrated by the 
taxable amount of the FTT on derivatives. Namely, the EU proposal takes the notional amount at the 
time the derivative agreement is purchased/sold, transferred, concluded or modified.52 This implies 
that derivatives are taxed on the basis of the value of the underlying principal, which implies a 
potentially large amount of tax to be paid compared to the actual amounts changing hands between 
parties to the derivative contract. Even though the proposal sets the tax rate at 0.01% instead of the 
0.1% for other transactions, this is clearly intended to render short term, speculative trades in financial 
derivatives much more costly.  
Further illustrative of the fact that the focus of the Directive is on trading which is not useful for the 
real economy but speculative, are the following three mitigating elements:  
• First, the tax is set at a low rate to minimise impact on the cost of capital for non-financial 
investment purposes.  
• Second, there is the exclusion from the scope of the FTT of transactions on primary markets 
both for securities (shares, bonds) – so as not to undermine the raising of capital by governments 
and companies – and for currencies.  
• Third, the exclusion of financial transactions for example with the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and with national central banks, from the scope of the FTT, so that the directive will not 
affect the refinancing possibilities of financial institutions or the instruments of monetary policy. 
Further, with its market correction objective in mind, the EU Directive aims to install an FTT which is 
broadly defined in scope as regards products, transactions, types of trade and financial actors, as well 
as transactions carried out inside a financial group. For example, the definition of financial institutions 
includes investment firms, organised markets, credit institutions, insurance and reinsurance 
undertakings, collective investment undertakings and their managers, pension funds and their 
managers, holding companies, financial leasing companies, special purpose entities, and foresees in 
delegated powers to the Commission so that it may set targets for ’significant’ activities of other 
entities whereby it would also be classed as a financial institution. As regards financial transactions 
the proposal includes spot transactions (shares, bonds, currencies) and derivatives transactions 
(forwards, futures, options, swaps, currency derivatives, commodity derivatives…),53 and this both on 
organized markets and ‘over-the-counter’ (OTC) transactions between financial institutions. This 
aspect illustrates the choice for a sweepingly broad financial transaction tax, but also raises an 
important question for global implementation. Namely, it is clear that the EU legal order is well-suited 
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for the kind of EU-wide harmonized approach necessary to implement this tax. Indeed, Member States 
are obliged to implement this Directive by 2014 if it enters into force as planned, and Member States 
are only given discretion to impose a higher tax rate than required by the Directive, if they so desire. 
This has important implications at global level. It is indeed questionable whether the ’nature of 
governance’ in the global financial system as it stands can accommodate the level of legal cooperation 
needed to install this tax? It is beyond the scope of this contribution to assess the legal changes needed 
to the global financial legal order. However, in different contributions I have argued that this would 
require nothing less than a revolution in global financial governance.54 
Having pointed to the fact that the EU Directive clearly has the market-intervention objective of 
limiting transactions that are not considered useful, we must now point to another, and very 
contentious issue surrounding the FTT. Namely, that of relocation. Relocation covers two distinct 
phenomena, namely that financial transactions would disappear altogether, or they would be avoided 
through engineering or geographic relocation outside of the taxing jurisdiction. Now more than ever, 
financial markets operate at global level. Implementing the financial transaction tax in a regionally or 
nationally fragmented way exponentially increases the risk of financial engineering to avoid the tax; 
with financial institutions fleeing the area where it has been implemented. Furthermore, there would 
be the incentive to avoid taxes through integration (conducting transactions within businesses rather 
than between them), resulting into larger financial institutions. In the proposed EU Directive, the FTT 
will be levied on the basis of the residence principle. This implies taxation in a Member State on the 
basis of establishment of financial actors, independent from the location of the transaction. This aspect 
is meant to increase geographic distribution across its territorial field of application, i.e. to avoid that 
the burden of the tax is concentrated solely in the financial centres. However, it does illustrate that the 
tax can only truly be effective if participation is as inclusive as possible. Indeed, if the FTT would be 
implemented only in the Eurozone, might we not see simply see massive relocation from Euro 
countries to The City, UK? Furthermore, if the FTT would be implemented at EU level, how does this 
impact EU financial markets? The simulations of the EU’s impact assessment implementing the tax in 
the EU-27 considers ”a relocation of securities markets by 10%, a relocation of spot currencies by 
40% and a relocation of derivatives instruments of 70% or 90%.”55 Relocation here implies the move 
of activities outside of the taxing jurisdiction, as well as their disappearance altogether. However, this 
is partially to be expected and even desirable, since it is one of the core objectives of the EU FTT: to 
the extent that algorithmic trading is considered harmful, such trading is currently about 40% of all 
transactions. It is these which would be rendered economically unviable, and which would be 
impacted the most.  
A final point is that of tax incidence, where an important critique is that it is uncertain where the 
burden of the tax would fall. According to the IMF, the real burden may fall largely on final 
consumers rather than earnings in the financial sector in the form of reduced returns to saving, higher 
costs of borrowing, and/or increases in final commodity prices.56 Commissioner Segeta ceded that 
point when asked about it on the day the EU Directive was launched, but argued that it is not 
problematic.57 On the one hand, he argued that the Directive defines taxpayer such that financial 
institutions will be liable, even if the private person is involved. Hence, whether the financial 
institutions pay, or pass it on to the consumer, depends on the competitive environment. Taking into 
account that there are more than 8800 banks in the EU, the argument goes that competition is 
sufficiently strong so that the possibility to pass this tax on to individual consumers is rather limited. 
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On the other hand, he argued that what taxes would befall individual citizens, would only be relevant 
for high income households. According to the Commissioner, citizens at a lower level of income, or 
middle income, do not engage in speculation in financial instruments. Hence there is a progressivity to 
the tax incidence, mainly linked with those who have a higher level of income. A similar argument has 
been made at global level. An expert report commissioned by the Leading Group argued that there 
would be a trickle-down effect whereby proportional to their involvement, economic market 
participants who benefit from globalisation would pay a small contribution equal to their 
involvement.58 To avoid individual citizens being negatively affected as much as possible, the EU 
proposal excludes from its scope the lending and borrowing activities of private households, 
enterprises or financial institutions, and other day-to-day financial activities, such as insurance 
contracts, mortgage lending, payment transactions or credit card payments. What would be included in 
the scope of the tax is then the subsequent trading of these via structured products (derivatives), but 
those are not activities engaged in by ordinary citizens. Similarly, spot currency transactions are 
excluded to preserve the free movement of capital,59 but derivatives based on currency transactions are 
included.60  
These being essential characteristics of the EU’s proposal, in the following penultimate section I 
examine the FTT Directive as a stepping stone for global implementation, and the potential for the 
Union to shape global financial governance through this initiative. 
5. The EU FTT Directive as a Stepping stone: Creating Alliances at the G-20. 
As mentioned, the June 2010 Toronto G-20 Summit Declaration only cursorily mentioned financial 
taxation, and the level of “consensus” reached by the Leaders was limited to say the least. However, 
within the limited paragraphs on financial taxation, there is room to accommodate the stated objectives 
of innovative financing and market correction.61 The relevant paragraphs stated the following: 
‘21. We agreed the financial sector should make a fair and substantial contribution towards paying 
for any burdens associated with government interventions, where they occur, to repair the financial 
system or fund resolution.  
22. To that end, we recognized that there is a range of policy approaches. Some countries are 
pursuing a financial levy. Other countries are pursuing different approaches. We agreed the range 
of approaches would follow these principles: 
-Protect taxpayers; 
-Reduce risks from the financial system; 
-Protect the flow of credit in good times and bad times; 
-Take into account individual countries’ circumstances and options; and, 
-Help promote a level playing field. 
23. We thanked the IMF for its work in this area.’62 
The above quotation of the Toronto Summit Declaration does not make a connection between a 
financial levy and dispensing the revenue towards the innovative financing for climate change or in 
support of the Millennium Development Goals. The only statement on the distribution of the revenue 
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is the ‘protection of taxpayers’, language which is deliberately open-ended on connecting taxation to 
refunding taxpayers for the bail-outs in a number of advanced economies. We have seen that the EU 
FTT Directive states that it is meant to serve as (i) a new source of revenue to meet post-crisis 
budgetary needs, (ii) to recover costs from the ‘bailouts’ of financial institutions, and (iii) to cover the 
costs of potential future financial crisis.63 That being the EU’s objectives, they are in rather strong 
contrast with the objectives for which civil society has advocated the financial transaction tax.64 Often 
using the currency-specific Tobin Tax as the most popular example, the argument has traditionally 
been that proceeds should be earmarked for the funding of global public goods. This includes 
development and support for the MDG’s, initiatives focusing specifically on health care, or the 
environment and combating climate change. Asked about any such earmarking at a press conference, 
Commissioner Segeta made clear that there was no such earmarking written into the EU proposal.65 
He pointed to the fact that the EU together with its Member States is the biggest donor in the world. 
The FTT will contribute to Member State and EU budgets at a ratio to be decided in the multi-annual 
financial framework, but at any rate will contribute to public coffers. Thus, according to the 
Commissioner, through alleviating pressures on public coffers, the FTT will contribute to financing 
for development and climate change.  
I submit that especially the argument of replenishing public coffers post-crisis bailouts will not 
provide sufficient traction towards installing the FTT at global level. Furthermore, the merely indirect 
contribution to global public goods will not suffice to garner global support. Indeed, and this is a 
purely political-strategic decision, if the EU wishes to have an FTT installed at global level it must 
emphasize the ‘fair contribution’ perspective. This is so because G20 significant countries such as 
China, India, Australia and Canada did not engage in bailouts as many European countries and the 
USA have done. This argument would therefore have less traction. Hence, in mustering political 
support for a global FTT, and in designing the distribution of FTT proceeds, it is best to focus on 
earmarking revenue for the provision of global public goods. 
Aside from the final recipients of the ‘fair contribution’ to be made by financial institutions, the 
language in the Toronto Summit Declaration is deliberately vague on the national, regional or global 
level at which to pursue a financial levy. The reference to government interventions ‘where they 
occur’ came at the request of countries such as India, Canada, Japan and China which did not bail-out 
their financial sectors. These do not feel as compelled as Western nations to have the financial sector 
compensate them for their interventions. The quotation of the 2011 Cannes Summit Declaration earlier 
in this contribution replicates that schism between different nations at G-20 level: “Some of us have 
implemented or are prepared to explore some of these options. We acknowledge the initiatives in some 
of our countries to tax the financial sector for various purposes, including a financial transaction tax, 
inter alia to support development.”66 Notably Canada has been a vocal opponent, with its Finance 
Minister stating that “We will continue leading that charge against a transactions tax and I am 
confident that our allies on this point, who are the emerging economies, will stay with us and join us in 
opposing what we view as a counterproductive tax. ... I am actually confident that we have enough of 
them in the G20 that we will be successful on that initiative”67 Canadian opposition explains why the 
Toronto Summit Declaration was so light on the topic of an FTT, and also shows the importance of the 
EU Directive and French presidency building momentum towards the Cannes summit. The fact that 
this summit has been overshadowed by the European sovereign debt crisis then decimated any such 
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momentum, as it was rather clear that the European Union had – to put it colloquially – ‘bigger fish to 
fry’. In any case, the distinction between some countries pursuing the financial levy and other 
countries having different approaches makes clear that while a global FTT is not excluded, enthusiasm 
is certainly highly limited and common agreement is lacking. The key for the EU proposal to succeed 
is then not to merely emphasize its innovative financing aspect, but to argue that it is compatible with 
the BRIC nations’ regulatory vision. Prior to the 2008 crisis, Western nations’ approaches were 
broadly deregulatory, whereas for Indian, China or Japan the opposite was true. Since the latter 
countries have been less averse to regulating their financial sectors,68 they view this as one of the key 
reasons for not having had to bail out their financial institutions. India could be one important BRIC 
nation the EU might sway to the pro-FTT camp. While currently sceptical, arguing that it might hurt 
its domestic banks, it has in the early 2000’s already argued in favour of the financial transaction tax at 
global level. Therefore, if the EU wishes to realize the FTT, it must emphasize the systemic market 
corrective function of international financial taxation, and push an FTT complementary with emerging 
powers’ vision on regulating finance. In this sense, the EU is to actively engage the changed power 
structure of global economic governance as part of the process of installing the FTT. 
6. Conclusion 
The objective if this contribution was to examine the global potential for the EU’s FTT proposal in a 
multi-polar world, in line with its binding, law-oriented mission statement of Article 21 TEU. What is 
certain is that the European Union in primary law has a strongly worded obligation to pursue 
multilateralism based on the rule of law. In light of this, it has been argued that the global financial 
transaction tax carries with it great potential for ‘legitimizing’ the European Union as a global actor 
through effective implementation of its FTT proposals – the EU as a global Robin Hood. However, 
this contribution has pointed to numerous internal and external obstacles to any such role for the EU 
on the global playing field. The first obstacle to EU global success lies within itself: strongly divided 
opinions between the Member States, and within the EU institutions themselves, on the merits of the 
global or regional financial transaction tax. Within the EU institutions, we have seen that 
Commissioners Barroso and Semeta did not agree on its merits, but that the latter realigned himself in 
light of political pressure from the highest echelons. Thus, from the Commission perspective we have 
seen a ‘single voice’ emerge. However, the same is not true for agreement between the Member States 
themselves. At the time of writing, Spring 2012, discussions within the Council are on-going on the 
EU-wide implementation of the FTT. Indicators for agreement among the EU-27 were not good. Early 
February 2012, a splinter group of EU countries led by France and Germany – joined by Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy – asked the Danish Presidency to fast-track plans 
for the FTT, possibly even through enhanced cooperation.69 Thus, potential for an EU single voice 
delivering a single message on the global stage is minimal at best. 
Assuming then that the European Union does manage to pull together, obstacles globally are 
equally, if not more, insurmountable. I have pointed to the fact that such would require a revolution in 
the way global finance is governed, and the Toronto and Cannes summits have shown that at present, 
the global FTT is a stillborn idea. Should the Union wish to trod onwards with a global financial 
transaction tax, the Union can only partially transpose its objectives to the global level. First, while the 
EU should certainly emphasize the market corrective and regulatory function as set out in the 
proposed EU Directive; it should pursue this tax towards raising extra funds for global public goods 
where funds are currently lacking due to significant public deficits. Indeed, (EU Member) States 
should not view this as an opportunity to replenish public coffers of those nations which have bailed 
out financial institutions. Clearly, widely different responses across the globe – especially in Asia – 
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would hinder consensus and render the FTT even more unlikely at G-20 level. Second, the market 
corrective function should be framed such to assure G-20 members geographical relocation will not 
pose grave risks to the major financial centres and the economies of the countries that host them. As a 
consequence, this section concludes that the global option in function of market stabilization and the 
provision of global public goods is the only feasible avenue towards implementing a global financial 
transaction tax. This, then, sets the stage for the legal and institutional features of a multilateral 
financial transaction tax convention. The features of such a multilateral convention, are discussed in a 
forthcoming contribution by the same author.70 
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